The Timeless Tug-of-War Over Taiwan

Article by Bella Wexler, Illustration by Mallika Sunder

For an island nineteen times smaller than the state of Texas, Taiwan makes for a rather large elephant in the room of global politics. 

Disputes between Beijing and Taipei have the potential for major disruptions in trade and even widespread conflict, as threatened by the Mainland (Brant 2021). Such issues date back to the Chinese Civil War in which the republican Kuomintang Party and the Chinese Communist Party fought over China’s future. Eventually cornered by Mao Zedong’s forces in 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek led the Kuomintang to flee the Mainland and plant roots in Taiwan. Since then, the relationship between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan has been a delicate and controversial balancing act, one that bears the weight of decades of suppressed Cold War tensions (New World Encyclopedia).

After initially backing Taiwan in a vain effort to offset the spread of Communism, Western powers soon shifted their support in order to build sustainable relations with the Chinese government (Albert 2018). As a result of this trend, Taiwan lost representation in transnational organizations like the UN and WHO, as well as most other countries’ recognition of the island’s nationhood. By the 1990s, Taiwan held its first free democratic elections. The island still holds such elections as the “Republic of China,” while possessing its own currency, military, and free press. 

In 1992, the Mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC) both signed the 1992 Consensus. In doing so, they agreed to acknowledge only “one China” of which Taiwan is a part. The controversy and complexity of this lies in the disparate interpretations held by Beijing and Taipei about the nature and finality of the agreement. Initially, both sides believed in one China, but each believed their party was its justified controller. Moreover, Taiwan has long considered the Consensus to be a launchpad for future negotiation with the CCP rather than an end in and of itself. 

But, new leadership has shifted Taiwan's politics even further. Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s current president and Democratic Progressive Party’s head, has rejected the 1992 Consensus and the “One China Policy” in favor of the potential for official Taiwanese independence. When asked point-blank in an interview with BBC about whether she intended to declare such official Taiwanese independence, Tsai chose her words carefully yet firmly; “we don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state…We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan)” (Sudworth 2020). The Mainland has kept a watchful eye on each of Taiwan’s elections, slowly deepening commercial ties with the island in an effort to make it economically dependent (Albert 2018). But, when President Xi Jinping of China came to power, he began implementing a tougher, more direct approach to coaxing Taiwan back, one whose narrative clashes with Tsai Ing-Wen’s vehement stance on Taiwanese independence. 

Witnessing the CCP response to Hong Kong protests in 2019 only further eroded Taiwanese public support for any semblance of reunion with China (Hass 2019). In fact, a survey conducted by the Taiwan New Constitution Foundation found that “Nearly 90 percent of the public identify themselves as Taiwanese and about two-thirds said they are willing to fight for the country in case of war” (Taipei Times 2021). The United States has long maintained a policy of “Strategic Ambiguity” with the Taiwanese government that stipulates the provision of military weapons, unofficial diplomatic ties, and economic relations without acknowledging Taiwanese nationhood. In the wake of the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, US President Biden was asked to expound on recent statements in which he referred to Taiwan as “independent;” however, he was quick to clarify that, “they have to decide — Taiwan, not us. We are not encouraging independence” (Everington 21). 

But what does it mean for Taiwan to decide, and what will it take for the world to listen? After all, while the vast majority of polled civilians in Taiwan identified with the ROC over the PROC, 50.1 percent still supported maintaining the status quo rather than provoking Chinese retaliation by declaring independence (Taipei Times 2021). 

To complicate matters even further, the ethnically Han Kuomintang were far from the first group to settle on the island. Before them, Taiwan saw occupation by the Mainland Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish. Yet, through all of this change and for thousands of years beforehand, sixteen indigenous tribes called the island home. In an open letter addressed to President Xi of China, Representatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan wrote “Taiwan is the sacred land where generations of our ancestors lived and protected with their lives. It doesn’t belong to China… We have fought against imperialism and every foreign intruder of our land… We the indigenous peoples of Taiwan have pushed this nation forward towards respect for human rights, democracy, and freedom. After thousands of years, we are still here. We have never given up our rightful claim to the sovereignty of Taiwan” (Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan to President Xi Jinping of China [translated by Taiwanese netizens]).

 Even as the Taiwanese government takes greater strides in recognition of cultural contributions of indigenous groups on the island, they are faced with the issue of how these narratives fit within the complex tapestry that is Taiwan’s contemporary identity. After all, these are people whose relationship with the land predates that of most people now pining over its ownership. While the world watches anxiously, the Chinese and Taiwanese governments continue to make their stark opposition clear and irreconcilable. Yet, on this island whose rich diversity can be traced back to generations of imperialism, contemplating independence begs an even further question: for whom?

Works Cited and Consulted

Albert, Eleanor. “China-Taiwan Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2018, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations.

Brimelow, Benjamin. “Fears of a Chinese Attack on Taiwan Are Growing, and Taiwan Isn’t Sure Who Would Help If It Happened.” Business Insider, 3 May 2021, www.businessinsider.com/not-clear-us-others-would-help-taiwan-if-china-attacked-2021-5.

Chen, Yu-Fu, and Jonathan Chin. “Nearly 90 Percent of Public Identify with Taiwan: Poll - Taipei Times.” Www.taipeitimes.com, 11 Aug. 2021, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2021/08/11/2003762406. Accessed 19 Dec. 2021.

“China-Taiwan Military Tensions ‘Worst in 40 Years.’” BBC News, 6 Oct. 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58812100.

Davidson, Helen. “Taiwan President Says China Threat Growing ‘Every Day’ as Biden Criticises Beijing.” The Guardian, 28 Oct. 2021, www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/27/taiwan-has-no-right-to-join-un-china-insists-as-us-ratchets-up-tensions.

Hass, Ryan. “Don’t Let Partisanship Poison US-Taiwan Relationship.” Brookings, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/16/dont-let-partisanship-poison-us-taiwan-relationship/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “History.” Government Portal of Republic of China, Taiwan, 6 Mar. 2019, www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php, A03000000B.

News, Taiwan. “Biden Says It’s up to Taiwanese to Decide Independence | Taiwan News | 2021-11-18 18:45:00.” Taiwan News, 18 Nov. 2021, www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4349374. Accessed 19 Dec. 2021.

Sudworth, John. “China Needs to Show Taiwan Respect, Says President.” BBC News, 14 Jan. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246.

“Taiwan - New World Encyclopedia.” Www.newworldencyclopedia.org, www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Taiwan. Accessed 19 Dec. 2021.

“原轉會各民族代表：台灣原住民族致中國習近平主席 ｜ 蘋果新聞網 ｜ 蘋果日報.” 蘋果新聞網, 8 Jan. 2019, tw.appledaily.com/forum/20190108/D2XNZZXLFYT7V7E46O2GYRLOBQ/. Accessed 19 Dec. 2021.